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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 24, 1803, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down
one of the most important decisions in American constitutional history.
The decision, Marbury v. Madison,1 greatly clarified the jurisdiction of
the three branches of government: legislative, executive and judicial. It is
fascinating to discover, more than two hundred years later and thousands
of miles from the United States that Marbury still reverberates in Israeli
constitutional law and the rulings of Israel's Supreme Court. While we
may take this revolutionary ruling for granted, some revolutionary deci-
sions by the Supreme Court in Israel, on questions similar to those
Dr. Yoram Rabin is a senior lecturer in the School of Law, the College of
Management Academics Studies Division in Rishon LeZion, Israel; Amon
Gutfeld is a professor of American legal and constitutional history at Tel-Aviv
University and at the School of Law at the Interdisciplinary Center in Herzliya,
Israel. For their helpful comments and insights we wish to thank Maeva Marcus,
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Dafna Barak-Erez, Amir DiNur, Aviam Soifer, Sharon
Ramon Stanley Kutler, Oren Gross and Netta Faivisevitch. Special thanks to
Elizabeth M. Sanchez whose thoughtful and careful editorial work have
immensely improved the final product.
' 5 U.S. 137 (1803) [hereinafter Marbury].
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decided in Marbury, are not yet accepted by consensus. Additionally,
under the Israeli legal system, the court's power of judicial review does
not arise from an express constitutional provision, as it does in most
Western legal systems. Rather, in Israel, the power of judicial review
exists through an interpretation of several bodies of constitutional docu-
ments. Similarly, the origin of judicial review in the U.S. is the Supreme
Court's interpretation of a constitutional document in Marbury, which
makes for an interesting comparison.
This paper discusses the influences of the Marbury decision in
Israeli constitutional law and the various contexts in which the Israeli
Supreme Court has cited Marbury in its rulings. In so doing, this paper
conducts a comparative analysis of the Marbury decision and those
Israeli Supreme Court decisions for which provided support.
To date, Marbury has been cited by the Israeli Supreme Court in
seven of its decisions.2 This paper will focus on two of these decisions.
The main legal issues put before the court in the decisions are among the
most fundamental and important of issues on which Israeli democracy is
based: the principles of the separation of powers and judicial review of
laws enacted by the legislature.
Before reviewing and analyzing these decisions, this paper first
discusses Marbury, the circumstances surrounding it and its historical
implications.3
II. THE U.S.A.: MARBURY v , MAD!S!ON
On October 16, 1800, just a few weeks before congressional and
presidential elections were to be held, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
2 HCJ 73/85 Kach Faction v. Shlomo Hillel-Knesset Speaker [1985] IsrSC
39(3) 141; HCJ 428/86 Yitzhak Barzilai, Adv. v. Government of Israel [1986]
IsrSC 40(3) 505; HCJ 142/89 Laor Movement One Heart and a New Spirit v.
Knesset Speaker [1990] IsrSC 44(3) 529, 538 (hereinafter "Laor"); HCJ 1000/92
Hava Bavli v. Rabbinical High Court Jerusalem [1994] IsrSC 48(2) 221; Civil
Appeal 6892/93 United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village [1995]
IsrSC 49(4) 221, 416 (hereinafter "Bank Hamizrahi"); HCJ 6652/96 The Asso-
ciation for Civil Rights in Israel v. Minister of the Interior, [1998] IsrSC 52(3)
117, 126; HCJ 1993/03 Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Prime
Minister, Mr. Ariel Sharon [2003] IsrSC 57(6) 817.
3 See SUZANNA SHERRY, The Intellectual Background ofMarbury v. Madison, in
ARGUING MARBURY V. MADISON 47. 47-64 (2005).
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Ellsworth resigned. President John Adams, leader of the soon-to-be-
defeated Federalist Party, nominated John Jay for the position. Everyone
was shocked by Adams' selection. Jay, a former Chief Justice and
current governor of the state of New York, declined the appointment, as
he believed that the U.S. Supreme Court lacked any politically operative
power. From his own experience he knew that the Supreme Court did not
play an important role in the national government.4 The U.S. Supreme
Court was, as Alexander Hamilton had contended, the "least dangerous
branch" of government. Jay also declined the nomination because the
justices were required to ride circuit. After receiving notice that Jay
declined the nomination, Adams had little time to nominate another can-
didate because Jay delayed his reply. Thus, Adams turned to his secre-
tary of state, John Marshall in an effort to avoid nominating William
Paterson, who the Federalists supported as a candidate.
On December 12 of that year, it became clear that Thomas
Jefferson and the Republican Party had won the presidential election.
The power of the federal judicial system was one of the main conflicts
between the Republicans and the Federalists during the latter's years in
power, and therefore was a stormy focus of tension during the election.5
Two months after it became apparent Jefferson had won, but
before Jefferson and his administration had formally commenced their
term of office, Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1801, which created
six new federal judicial circuits.' Within thirteen days, Adams forwarded
a list of sixteen new judges to Congress, all loyal Federalist Party
4 WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC: THE
CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN JAY AND OLIVER ELSWORTH 124-125 (1995);
JAMES PERRY, SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENTS 1789-1801: CRITERIA, PRESI-
DENTIAL STYLE AND THE PRESS OF EVENTS 6 (1998).
5 JACK N. RAKOVE, The Political Presidency: Discovery and Intervention, in
THE REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 30
(2002); NORMAN K. RISJORD, THOMAS JEFFERSON 114 122, 135 136;
BERNARD A. WEISBERGER, AMERICA AFIRE 227 277, 292 293 (2002); JOHN
FERLNG, ADAMS VS. JEFFERSON: THE TUMULTUOUS ELECTION OF 1800 at 162
196 (2004).
6 Congress repealed the Judiciary Act of 1801 in March of 1802 and in April,
declared the Judiciary Act of 1789 was once again operative. That meant that the
Supreme Court would meet in February, skipping the June and December terms
stipulated in the 1801 Act. See HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP
OF JOHN MARSHALL. 1801-1835 at 54-57 (1997).
2007]
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
members, and the appointments were subsequently approved on March
2, 1801. The Judiciary Act of 1801 also stated that the next Supreme
Court vacancy would not be filled, thereby reducing the number of
justices from six to five. This was an attempt by the Federalist Congress
to deny Jefferson the opportunity to appoint a judge to the Supreme
Court.
In addition, at the very end of Adams's term, Congress also
passed the Organic Act of the District of Columbia, which regulated the
appointment of justices of the peace to the District of Columbia
adjoining Alexandria, Virginia. Relying on this law, and on an existing
act of Congress passed the previous year, which authorized the President
to make these appointments to the magistrates' courts in the districts and
to decide on the number needed in each district, outgoing President John
Adams appointed forty-two new justices of the peace to the magistrates
courts in the District of Columbia. As a purely political decision, the
Senate later confirmed each appointment. Most significantly, one of the
forty-two justices appointed was William Marbury.
After Adams signed the commissions and the Senate approved,
the commissions were returned to Marshall, then secretary of state, to be
stamped with the Great Seal of the United States. This took place at nine
o'clock in the evening on March 3. Coincidentally, Adams' term as
president would end at midnight that same day. Marshall delivered the
commissions, but in his haste, four of the commissions were overlooked,
including that of Marbury. Consequently, the Marbury's appointment
and three others remained unsealed.
After he was sworn into office, Jefferson found the undelivered
commissions and instructed that some of them be withheld, an
instruction that denied the validity of the appointment of four justices of
the peace, including Marbury. This was the opening salvo in what would
be a broad and unbridled Republican attack against one of the pillars of
the American system: the autonomy and independence of members of the
judicial system after their appointment and approval by the Senate.
Jefferson, who proved himself a majoritarian, had no qualms about using
an elected majority to achieve his goals, even at the price of destroying
the very foundations of American democracy. Accordingly, Jefferson,
furious at Adams's last-minute action, reduced the number of appointees
from forty-two to thirty and submitted the new list for Senate approval.
[Vol. 15:2
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Jefferson also sought abrogation of the Circuit Court Act by
Congress and the dismissal of the sixteen new federal judges appointed
by Adams. To complete the task, Congress passed an act that delayed the
convening of the Supreme Court for approximately one year because
they feared that the Court might try to abrogate the law as unconsti-
tutional. Congress also believed that the Republicans would win two-
thirds of both houses in the congressional elections of November 1802,
which would precede the convening of the Supreme Court in February
1803, the result of which would be that Congress could then impeach all
the federalist judges who had been appointed for life
A petition filed in the Supreme Court by Marbury, and the other
three commissioned justices of the peace, asked the Court to issue a writ
of mandamus commanding James Madison, the new secretary of state in
the Jefferson administration, to deliver their commissions as justices of
the peace for the District of Columbia. Madison and the Republican
Attorney General, Levi Lincoln, ignored the petition out of loyalty to the
Executive and the obligation they felt to protect its rights, despite a
competing respect for the Supreme Court. Marshall, a new chief justice
who was also a political appointee, feared that, the petition, filed by the
members of his own party, might well arouse the ire of the President,
Congress and the public. The possibility that President Jefferson and
Secretary of State Madison would simply ignore a ruling against them as
they had ignored the petition itself was far from untenable.
Conversely, dismissal of the petition from Marbury and his
colleagues was inherently intolerable to Marshall. At issue was whether
the appointments of Marbury and the other three justices of the peace
were legitimate where they were a result of a hasty political action by a
lame duck president. Additionally, Adams had pushed through these
appointments "by whip and spur" as Jefferson phrased it
In view of this political and legal complication, Marshall,
employing impressive legal dexterity, was able to produce a judicial tour
de force which bore aloft that "ostensibly powerless" institution the
Supreme Court. With great wisdom, Marshall unraveled the political
tangle and raised the Supreme Court to unprecedented heights. However,
the Federalists, the parties to the case, and the Republicans all found
reason to quarrel with the opinion, although not on the issue of judicial
review. Marbury and the others were denied their commissions; the
Federalists thought the decision cowardly; the Republicans were furious
2007]
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with Marshall's lecture to Jefferson about executive power, believing
that the Court in this matter lacked jurisdiction
Marshall's decision contains not the slightest hint of the political
drama that took place in the background, or of the disrespectful attitude
of the new (Republican) administration toward the Supreme Court.
Marbury was dealt with by Marshall on the technical, formal level, along
a narrow and clearly delineated path. First, he ruled that the commissions
were written, signed and sealed, and thus were lawful and valid. He then
turned to the question of his ability to intervene in the activities of the
executive branch and instruct it to act in a contrary way (i.e. to issue a
writ of mandamus against Madison, instructing him not to delay the
commissions any longer).'
For the purpose of this paper, it is appropriate to discuss the right
of the Court to intervene. The Court left this question to the end of the
inquiry, even though its natural place was earlier on since to discuss it
first would have rendered the discussion of the other issues superfluous.
It is the inquiry into this issue in particular that eventually gave rise to
the historical and vitally important decisions in this case. There are those
who believe that Justice Marshall reversed the logical order in his
opinion so that he could "lecture" Secretary of State Madison on his duty
to deliver the commissions in compliance with the law and launch a
daring and shrewd attack condemning Jefferson's administration for the
way in which it had opposed the Judiciary. This is particularly relevant
as he recognized that an operative relief in the form of a writ of manda-
mus against the Executive was unrealistic in the circumstances, and his
only option was therefore to employ piercing legal rhetoric against the
administration's conduct in the affair.
In discussing the last and most decisive matter concerning the
Court's ability to intervene in an executive act, the Court referred to the
relevant constitutional basis, the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitu-
tion of the United States. Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution defines
the original jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court. However, this provi-
sion does not authorize the Court to issue writs of mandamus to federal
officers. Yet, Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the
7 THOMAS N. SHEVORY, JOHN MARSHALL'S LAW: INTERPRETATION, IDEOLOGY,
AND INTEREST 45-51 (1994); FRANCIS N. STITES, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER
OF THE CONSTITUTION 81-92, 129-137 (1981); CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE
CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW 47-71 (1996).
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Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to persons holding office
under the authority of the United States. In practice, Section 13 was
clearly intended to authorize the issue of writs of mandamus in cases that
conferred jurisdiction to the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, Justice
Marshall construed Section 13 differently, ruling that the last sentence of
Section 13, which authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of manda-
mus to public officers, does not dovetail with the Constitution. He further
held that the legislation of that section was an attempt by Congress to
broaden the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in contravention of the
Constitution, which delineated its original jurisdiction in great detail.
Marshall's interpretation that Section 13 violates the constitution enabled
him to instruct that the Judiciary Act be abrogated as unconstitutional.
Marshall intended to establish the autonomy and independence
of the Judiciary, thus preventing it from being "brought to justice and
impeached" by the Jefferson administration, and to block the expected
opposition by Jefferson and the Executive branch (an expectation that
was based on the knowledge that any writ of mandamus requiring execu-
tion would meet strong opposition and was therefore unrealistic, and
would serve merely to further curtail the powers of the court). Marshall
also sought to decry the Executive branch, under Jefferson's leadership,
for its inappropriate attitude toward the Judiciary for disobeying the law
and the Constitution. He further sought to warn the Republican Congress
not to erode the autonomy and independence of the Supreme Court.
Thomas Jefferson understood the ramifications of this decision. In a
letter to a friend, he wrote that, according to the Marbury decision, the
Constitution gives the Supreme Court the right to prescribe rules for the
other branches of government. Jefferson emphasized his dismay at the
fact that only the unelected branch of government could overrule the
other elected branches and he concluded that "the Constitution on this
hypothesis is a mere thing of wax in the hands of the judiciary, which
they may twist and shape into any form they please."'
There is a great deal of evidence that the Founding Fathers
intended to establish the practice of judicial review in the Constitution.
The issue was controversial, but the Supreme Court employed it in the
8 10 THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 141 (Paul L. Ford
ed.. G.P. Putnam's Sons 1899).
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1790s.9 The Marbury decision was initially ignored and was later
rediscovered after the Civil War. Law professors have turned it into the
momentous decision that it is today, but as a historical matter, it was not
the case that introduced the precedent of the doctrine of judicial review."0
Across the Atlantic and almost two centuries later, the Israeli
Supreme Court in Bank Hamizrahi" was influenced by Marshall's deci-
sion in the matter of judicial review. Israel's Chief Justice, Aharon Barak
once called the Bank Hamizrahi decision "our Marbury v. Madison"
1 2
The decision in Bank Hamizrahi was the first in which the Israeli
Supreme Court reviewed a law legislated by Israel's House of Represen-
tatives, the Knesset, and in so doing, determined that the Supreme
Courthas the power of judicial review. The following discussion will
therefore describe the constitutional basis and background of the Israeli
system as it was immediately before Bank Hamizrahi.
III. ISRAEL: CONSTITUTION AS "A SHIP BUILT AT SEA"
To understand the Israeli constitutional reality and the use of
Marbury by Israel's Supreme Court, this section offers a brief description
of the constitutional development in Israel since its establishment. 3
9 See MAEVA MARCUS, Judicial Review in the Early Republic, in LAUNCHING
THE "EXTENDED REPUBLIC": THE FEDERALIST ERA 25 53 (1996); William M.
Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455 (2005);
GORDON S. WOOD, Launching the "Extended Republic ": The Federalist Era, in
LAUNCHING THE "EXTENDED REPUBLIC" : THE FEDERALIST ERA 12 15 (1996);
Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review, 22 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1293
(1988); LEONARD LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION
89-99 (1988); RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 47-143
(1969).
10 See Marcus, supra note 9; CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN
JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE LAWS 40 46, 90
117 (1986).
11 See Bank Hamizrahi, supra note 2. Aharon Barak, The American Constitution
and Israeli Law, in, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: THE REAL, THE IMAGINARY AND
THE FALSE 81 (Arnon Gutfeld ed., 2002) (Ganei Aviv-Lod, Israel) [Hebrew].
12 See WILLIAM E. NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE LEGACY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 104-113 (2000) on the impact of judicial review worldwide.
13 The historical background provided here is taken mainly from Daphne Barak-
Erez, From an Unwritten to a Written Constitution: The Israeli Challenge in
American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309 (1995).
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A. The Basic Laws
When Israel was founded in 1948 after thirty years of the British
Mandate, its founders assumed that a constitution and a bill of rights
would be forthcoming. 14 Indeed, the Declaration on the Establishment of
the State of Israel (also known as the Declaration of Independence)
contained an explicit promise to draft a written constitution. However,
soon after the Declaration was proclaimed, events took a different
course. Internal political squabbles regarding the content of the future
constitution prevented agreement upon a text that would gain broad-
based support in a heterogeneous Israeli society, comprised of immi-
grants coming from diverse cultural backgrounds with strongly held
opposing ideologies nationalist, socialist and religious. 5 In 1950 it
became apparent that MAPAI the ruling party at the time (an ante-
cedent of the current Israel Labour Party) was unwilling to draft a consti-
tution against the opposition of the religious parties, which formed part
of the coalition government." Consequently, the first Knesset adopted an
historical compromise-the 'Harari Resolution' (named after its spon-
sor). This resolution stated the following:
The first Knesset charges the Constitutional, Legislative
and Judicial Committee with the duty of preparing a
draft Constitution for the State. The Constitution shall be
composed of individual chapters in such a manner that
each of them shall constitute a basic law in itself. The
individual chapters shall be brought before the Knesset
as the Committee completes its work, and all the
14 For this history in general see Barak-Erez, supra note 13; Menachem
Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unplanned Constitutional Reform:
Constitutional Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (1996).
15 Barak-Erez, supra note 13, at 312.
16 Hofnung, supra note 14 at 588; see also Asher Maoz, Constitutional Law, in
THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL SURVEYS 5 at 7 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylviane
Colombo eds., Jerusalem, Sacher Institute, 1995). There are also speculations
that Prime Minister Ben-Gurion was reluctant to restrict, through the enactment
of a constitution, his freedom of political manoeuvring. See Barak Cohen,
Empowering Constitutionalism with Text from an Israeli Perspective, 18 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 585. 629 (2003).
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chapters together will form the State Constitution"
(unofficial translation).17
The wording of the Harari Resolution represents a political compromise
that has enabled the Knesset to evade the obligation articulated in the
Declaration of Independence to produce a formal constitution, while at
the same time preserving its legal competence to enact one.] 8 Although
academics questioned whether the First Knesset's authority to enact a
constitution was validly delegated to subsequent elected Knessets, 19 in
practice, the Knesset (from the third Knesset onwards) enacted a series of
eleven basic laws.2 °
The first nine Basic Laws enacted before 1992 addressed the
structure of the State's political and legal system and the powers of its
principal institutions. Some Basic Laws defined the powers of the
legislative,2 1 the executive,2 2 the president,2 3 the judiciary2 4 and the State
comptroller. 25 Other Basic Laws contained essential principles concern-
ing the management of State lands,2 6 the State economy,27 the armed
forces28 and the designation of Jerusalem as the national capital of
Israel.29 However, until 1992, the Basic Laws did not, by and large,
17 DK (1950) 1743.
18 Hofnung, supra note 14, at 588.
19 Maoz, supra note 16, at 7. See Amnon Rubinstein, Israel's Piecemeal
Constitution, 16 Scripta Hierosolymitana 201 (1966); see also Melville B.
Nimmer, The Uses of Judicial Review in Israel ' Quest for a Constitution, 70
COLUM. L. REV. 1217 (1970).
20 This practical custom received a legal approval by the majority opinion in
Bank Hamizrahi.
21 Basic Law: the Knesset, 1958, S.H. 69
22 The original Basic Law: the Government, 22 L.S.I 257, 1968, S.H. 226, was
replaced by two new Basic Laws: first in 1992 (Basic Law: the Government, 1992,
S.H. 214) and then again in 2001 (Basic Law: the Government, 2001, S.H. 158).
23 Basic Law: the President of the State, 1964, S.H. 118.
24 Basic Law: The Judicature, 1984, S.H. 78.
25 Basic Law: the State Comptroller, 1988, S.H. 30.
26 Basic Law: Israeli Land, 1960, S.H. 56.
27 Basic Law: State Economy, 1975, S.H. 206.
28 Basic Law: The Armed Forces, 1976, S.H. 154.
29 Basic Law: Jerusalem, the Capital of Israel, 1980, S.H. 186.
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protect human rights.30 As a result, the pre-1992 'Israeli constitution'
was described as a 'body without a soul' an institutional and political
legal framework lacking meaningful safeguarding of substantive
values. 3'
This phenomena changed dramatically in 1992 when the Knesset
adopted two new Basic Laws designed to protect human rights: Basic
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty32 and Basic Law: Freedom of Occupa-
tion 33 -establishing the constitutional supremacy of several important
human rights: the right to life, the right to bodily integrity, the right to
human dignity, the right to property, the right to personal liberty, pri-
vacy, freedom of occupation, and the right of citizens to leave and re-
enter the country. Most significantly, both basic laws included 'entrench-
ment clauses' (or supremacy clauses)-i.e., specific language prohibiting
infringement upon these protected rights, included by way of legislation,
unless it meets four basic conditions (contained in 'limitation clauses'):
(1) it is prescribed by law, (2) it is compatible with Israel's basic values
as a Jewish and democratic State, (3) it promotes a worthy purpose; (4)
and it does not introduce excessive restrictions. 4 Hence, the effect of
30 An exception could be found in article 4 of the Basic Law: The Knesset,
which pronounces, among other things, the right to equality in voting to the
Knesset. Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, 12 LSI 85 (1957 1958) (Isr.).
This article contains a so-called 'entrenchment clause' providing that its provi-
sions shall not be amended except by a special majority vote in the Knesset. In
1969, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of this entrenchment clause and
invalidated legislation conflicting with the entrenchment provision since the
requisite majority had not adopted it. See H.C.J. 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of
Finance, 23(1) P.D. 693 (1969), translated in Judicial Review of Statute, 4 Isr L.
Rev. 559, 559-565 (1969).
31 Barak-Erez, supra note 13, at 315 ('The constitutional project could not be
completed without an agreement on the heart of every modem constitution: a
definition of individual rights and the form of their protection').
32 Printed in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 31 Isr. L. Rev. 21-23
(1997).
33 Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 114. This Basic Law was
replaced in 1994 by Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1994, S.H. 90. The full
text of this Law is also reprinted in Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 31
Isr. L. Rev. 21 23 (1997).
34 Basic Law: Human Dignity Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty (1992),
art. 8, 9; Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (1994) art. 4. This language was
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these Basic Laws has been to subject subsequent Knesset legislation to
their provisions (Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation even subjected
antecedent legislation to its provisions) 5
B. Judicial Bill of Riights
Basic Laws represent only one part of Israel's constitutional
scheme and that important jurisprudence concerning human rights pro-
tection was generated by the Supreme Court even before 1992. In fact,
promotion of human rights by Supreme Court judgments36 could be
viewed as a reaction by the part of the Court to the prolonged inaction by
the Knesset in promoting human rights through the enactment of Basic
Laws. 7
In its pre-1992 case law, the Supreme Court recognized and
enforced several important human rights such as the right to personal
clearly inspired from comparative constitutional law and international law. See
eg, See, e.g., Constitution Act, 1982, Part 1 [Can.]; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, 18-19, 21-22, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S
172.; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10-11, Nov. 4 1950, 213 U.N.T.S 222. It may be noted that Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation also contains in article 7 a "procedural entrench-
ment clause", which requires absolute majority in the Knesset in order to amend
the Basic Law. While it is not completely clear what Parliamentary majority is
needed to amend other basic laws, the dominant view is that any majority will
suffice. Hofnung, supra note 14, at 594, 598.
35 David Kretzmer, "Israel's Basic Laws on Human Rights," in ISRAELI
REPORTS To THE XV INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 293 at
302 (Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, ed., Jerusalem, Sacher Institute, 1999). Article
10 of the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation did however provide that review
of antecedent legislation would only be possible 10 years after its entry into
force. This period had expired on 14 March 2002.
36 Supreme Court judgments constitute binding precedents under the Israeli legal
See Basic Law: The Judicature, article 20 ("Precedent issued by the Supreme
Court is binding upon all instances except upon the Supreme Court").
37 See Cohen, supra note 16, at 636 642; Stephen Goldstein, Protection of
Human Rights by Judges: The Israeli Experience, 38 St. Louis U. L.J. 605, at
605 (1994) ("In Israeli law, human rights have been protected almost exclu-
sively by judge-made law. Indeed, almost uniquely in the world, Israeli courts
have fashioned the law of human rights out of whole cloth").
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liberty;38 freedom of occupation;39 freedom of speech;40 freedom of
religion and conscience; 41 the right to equality;42 and certain procedural
due process rights (normally referred to in Israeli jurisprudence as 'rules
of natural justice'). 43 These judge-made rights have sometimes been
referred to as 'the Israeli judicial bill of rights' 44 or 'fundamental prin-
ciples of the Israeli legal system' .4 Having no constitutional text to rely
upon, the Court based its findings upon the Israeli legal system through
reference to principles derived from the democratic nature of the State,
from its 'national spirit' and from the 'social consensus', all reflected in
the State's Declaration of Independence 46 and in the history of Israel and
38 HCJ 7/48, Al-Karbutli v. Minister of Defence [1949] IsrSC 2 5
39 HCJ 1/49, Bejerano v. Minister of Police [1949] IsrSC 2 80.
40 HCJ 73/53, Kol Ha'am v. Minister of Interior [1953] IsrSC 7(3) 871. See also,
1 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, "Kol Ha'am
Company Limited v. Minister of the Interior", at 90 (E. David Gotein ed., The
Ministry of Justice 1962) (English version).
41 HCJ 262/62, Peretz v. Local Council of Kfar Shmaryahu [1962] IsrSC 16(3)
2101 See also, 4 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURTOF ISRAEL,
"Peretz v. Local Council of Kfar Shmaryahu", at 191 (Asher Felix Landau ed.,
The Ministry of Justice 1975) (English version).
42 Id. See also H.C.J. 509/80, Younes v. Director General of the Office of the
Prime Minister [1981] IsrSC 35(3) 589.
43 HCJ 3/58, Berman v. Minister of the Interior [1958] IsrSC 12(2) 1493. See
also, 3 SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, "Berman v.
Minister of the Interior", at 29 (Asher Felix Landau ed., The Ministry of Justice
1968) (English version).
44 Neta Ziv, "Combining Professionalism, Nation Building and Public Service:
The Professional Project of the Israeli Bar 1928-2002" 71 Fordham L. Rev.
1621, at 1639 (2003).
45 See e.g. HCJ 292/83, Mount Temple Faithful Association v. Chief of the
Jerusalem District Police [1984] IsrSC 38(2) 449, 454; HCJ 680/88, Shnitzer v.
Chief Military Censure[1989] IsrSC 42(4) 617, 627.
46 Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3
(1948) (Isr.). ("The State of Israel ... will be based on freedom, justice and
peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of
social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or
sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and
culture; it will safeguard the Holly Places of all religions; and it will be faithful
to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations".
2007]
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
the Jewish people.47 In reality, it may be asserted that these judge-made
human rights derive largely derived from natural law.
The implications of recognizing human rights as part of the
Israeli judicial bill of rights were twofold: (a) statutory interpretation a
presumption that legislation should be construed, as far as possible, as
being consistent with recognized human rights;4 8 (b) limitation of
administrative power-administrative law presumed that State officials
were not authorized to violate recognized human rights, unless explicit
and contrary authorizing language in Knesset legislation could be
shown.49 This last proposition also implied that secondary legislation
conflicting with recognized human rights was invalid (unless there was
explicit authorization in primary legislation to override human rights).
Powerful as the Israeli judicial bill of right might be, 0 one
caveat is obvious. The doctrine never purported to authorize the courts to
47 Barak-Erez, supra note 13, at 315-316. A landmark precedent in this context
is Kol Ha'am., H.C.J. 73/53, supra note 40, at 884 ("The system of laws under
which the political institutions ... have been established and function are witness
to the fact that this is indeed a State founded on democracy. Moreover, the
matters set forth in the declaration of Independence especially as regards
basing the State 'on the foundation of freedom' and securing freedom of
conscience-mean that Israel is a freedom-loving country. It is true that the
Declaration 'does not include any constitutional laying down in fact any rule
regarding the maintaining or repeal of any ordinances or laws' ... but in so far as
it 'expresses the vision of the people and its faith, we are bound to pay attention
to the matters set forth therein when we come to interpret and give meaning to
the laws of the State").
48 See e.g., CA 6871/99, Rinat v. Rom, [2002] IsrSC 56(4) P.D. 72, 92; V.C.P
4459/94, Salmonov v. Sharbani, [1994] IsrSC 49(3) 479, 482; CA 524/88, Pri
Ha'Emek Agricultural Cooperative Association Inc. v. Sde Ya'akov
Workers Cooperative Village [1991] IsrSC 45(4) 529, 561; HCJ 693/91, Efrat v.
Population Registry Supervisor, Ministry of the Interior [1993] IsrSC 47(1).
749, 763; Goldstein, supra note 37, at 610; Yoram Rabin, The Right to
Education 339 (Jerusalem, Nevo, 2003) [in Hebrew].
49 See e.g., HCJ 5128/94, Federman v. Minister of Police [1995] IsrSC 48(5)
647, 652; Goldstein, supra note 37, at 610; Rabin, ibid. at 339.
50 In fact, an analogy could be drawn between the powers of the Israeli judiciary
under the judicial bill of rights doctrine and the powers of the English judiciary
under the Human Rights Act, 1998 to construe legislation and to review
administrative acts. The main difference between the two systems of human
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invalidate Knesset legislation.5 1 Hence, it gave only limited legal protec-
tion to human rights.
To conclude, the Israeli court recognized human rights in
extensive case law long before the 1990s. In 1992, the Knesset passed
the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and the Basic Law: Freedom
of Occupation, which expressly protected several human rights. How-
ever, recognition of basic rights in Israel, both in case law and in these
basic laws, was not accompanied by a formal change in the power of the
Supreme Court. So, while some basic rights were now specifically
protected, both materially and procedurally, the question of judicial
review remained unchanged, i.e. what power does the court have to
pronounce void a law of the Knesset that violates the rights protected by
the basic laws, without meeting the criteria allowing such violation? The
answer to this question was given by the Supreme Court in Bank
Hamizrahi, which laid the cornerstone for a constitutional revolution in
Israel.
Bank Hamizrahi concerned a law that was allegedly unconsti-
tutional in that it unlawfully violated Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty. In its comprehensive and extensive analysis of the changing
constitutional reality and while citing Justice Marshall in Marbury, the
Supreme Court held that it, has power of judicial review of any uncon-
stitutional law enacted by the Knesset. Bank Hamizrahi and the Court's
reference to Marbury therein are discussed at length below.
rights protection is that Israeli judges are not competent to issue a declaration of
incompatibility like their English counterparts. For a comparative analysis of
Israeli and English systems of human rights protection, see Ariel L. Bendor and
Zeev Segal, , Constitutionalism and Trust in Britain: An Ancient Constitutional
Culture, A New Judicial Review Model, 17 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 683 (2002).
51 However Justice Barak (as he was then) has opined in obiter dicta that in
extreme circumstances the Court could conceivably invalidate legislation, which
is inconsistent with fundamental principles of the legal system. Laor, supra note
2. at 554.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF MARBURY V. MADISON
ON ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Bank Hamizrahi case and the principle ofjudicial review
In Bank Hamizrahi, a number of creditors, including financial
institutions such as United Mizrahi Bank, which in Hebrew is called
Bank Hamizrahi, petitioned the Supreme Court in relation to agricultural
settlements in Israel that owed the creditors hundreds of millions of
shekels. The petition revolved around a new law enacted by the Knesset
(or rather, an amendment to an existing law), which intervened in the
terms for debt repayment to creditors by debtors from this sector. Inter
alia, the law granted protection, on certain conditions, against the
standard court proceedings for debt collection, and instead allowed for
their rescheduling through an outside entity appointed for that purpose.
In its extreme format, the law also permitted in certain cases, the
write-off of considerable parts of those debts. The creditors contended
that the law is unconstitutional in that it violates their property rights, as
specifically anchored in Section 3 of Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, and that this violation is not in accordance with the requirements
of the "Violation of Rights" clause. This was the first petition considered
by the Supreme Court after the legislation of two new Basic Laws that
attacked a Knesset law for unconstitutionality in relation to one of these
two new Basic Laws.
This petition was a golden opportunity for the President of the
Supreme Court and most of the other justices who concurred with his
judgments, sitting en banc, including, as a one-time precedent, a retired
president of the Supreme Court, to carry the revolutionary message of the
establishment of a constitution for Israel. In the decision, which is an
unprecedented 368 pages, numerous constitutional issues were
expounded and discussed, many of which extended far beyond what the
Court was required to address for its decision on the issues before it.
After it ruled that the Knesset has the power to enact basic laws whose
normative status is superior to primary legislation passed by the Knesset
in its capacity as Legislature, the Court examined the argument of the
petitioners on its merits, and eventually dismissed it, ruling that while the
new law violates the petitioners' property rights, this violation meets the
conditions of the "Violation of Rights" clause.
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The Court also considered the question of judicial review, and
ruled that even though Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and Basic
Law: Freedom of Occupation do not contain a primacy provision
stipulating that any norm that does not meet the requirements set forth
therein is void, the Court is nevertheless competent to declare such
violating norms void. After a comparative review on this point, in
countries other than the U.S., the Court explained that judicial review is
an implementation of the principles of the rule of law, democracy and the
separation of powers. In this analysis, the Court cited Justice Marshall in
Marbury. Justice Barak explained that after Marbury, a law that contra-
venes the provisions of the American Constitution is void, and any court
may declare it so, even though there is no specific provision authorizing
this in the Constitution. Justice Barak quotes Justice Marshall as
follows 52:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited and
that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the
constitution is written. To what purpose are powers
limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed
to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by
those intended to be restrained? The distinction between
a government with limited and unlimited powers is
abolished, if those limits do not confine the persons on
whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts
allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too
plain to be contested, that the constitution controls any
legislative act repugnant to it; or, that the legislature may
alter the constitution by an ordinary act. Between these
alternatives there is no middle ground. The constitution
is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by
ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legisla-
tive acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it.
Later in his opinion, Justice Barak adds that a constitutional
restriction upon the legislature will only have meaning if an ordinary law
52 See Bank Hamizrahi, supra note 2, at 416 and Marbury, 5 U.S. at 176.
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cannot supersede the provisions of the Basic Law. Here too, Justice
Barak cites Justice Marshall 53:
If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution,
is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the
courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other
words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as
operative as if it was a law? It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule. If two
laws conflict with each other, the courts must decide on
the operation of each. So if a law be in opposition to the
constitution: if both the law and the constitution apply to
a particular case, so that the court must either decide that
case conformably to the law, disregarding the consti-
tution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding
the law: the court must determine which of these
conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very
essence of judicial duty. If, then, the courts are to regard
the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any
ordinary act of the legislature, the constitution, and not
such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they
both apply.
Justice Barak concludes that since Marbury no court in the
United States has questioned whether a law repugnant to the Constitution
is void, and that it is the duty of the court in interpreting the constitution
and the law, to determine whether the ordinary act violates the Constitu-
tion, and if so what the consequences should be. Barak contends this is
how the theory of judicial review of constitutionality, a cornerstone of
the American constitutional system, was born.
The power of judicial review declared by the Court in Bank
Hamizrahi was not restricted to cases in which the ostensibly uncon-
stitutional law conflicts with the specific provisions of the two new basic
laws and the individual rights enumerated in them. In such cases there
was consensus that the Court can review the conflicting law and
pronounce it void if the Court finds that the conflicting law does not
51 See id.
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correspond to the requirements of the Basic Law. As became apparent
over time, the Court broadened its ruling so that the court could also, in
practice, exercise the power of judicial review over cases in which it was
alleged that the unconstitutional law violates human rights that are not
expressly enumerated in the Basic Laws, and which are constitutionally
protected solely as an exegetical derivative of Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty by the Court. Note that this protection was granted
by the Court despite the fact that many of these derived rights were
deliberately omitted from the Basic Laws because of disagreements in
the Legislature about their inclusion. Such disagreements were a
reflection of the complex and unstable conditions surrounding the issue
of the Israeli constitution. Moreover, the Court applied its ruling, retro-
actively, to Basic Laws enacted prior to 1992 and whose provisions do
not include any form of protection 54 . Among the Justices who delivered
the majority opinion, there were a few who warned against the presenta-
tion of Bank Hamizrahi as a constitutional revolution and against the
over-broadening of its application. Those Justices believed it was better
to see the new Basic Laws as a further development in a process that
started many years earlier. In other words, this was not a cornerstone, but
just another milestone.
54 See HCJ 212/03 Herut National Movement v. Chairman of the Central
Election Conmmittee for the 16th Knesset, [2003] IsrSC 57(1) 750, at 754- 756
(hereinafter: "Herut").
55 For example, in Bank Hamizrahi the opinion of Justice Y. Zamir, who sided
with the majority, is worded modestly and carefully as to the role of the court in
starting a constitutional revolution. Zamir refrains from saying that the Court has
started a revolution; rather, he tones down and smoothes the rough edges of the
dramatic and precedent-setting dimension of the Court's actions. In his opinion,
the legislation of new basic laws in 1992 was merely a further development, just
another layer, in the Israeli constitutional system, which had started many years
earlier in Bergman (supra note 30), and that we should proceed gradually in this
process, since leapfrogging could undermine the stability which is essential to
constitutional development (Bank Hamizrahi, supra note 2, at pp. 504-505). See
also: HCJ 453/94 Israel Women's Network v. Government of Israel et al, 501,
[1994] IsrSC 48(5) 534-536 (hereinafter: "IWN"), where Justice Zamir expres-
ses his opinion on whether the phrase "human dignity" in Sections 2 and 4 of the
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, also includes the principle of equality.
He says that the Court should beware of making obiter dicta on constitutional
issues and other matters of principle where they are not essential for the decision
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Both the decision in Marbury and the decision in Bank
Hamizrahi were revolutionary in their time. In both cases, the Supreme
Court used the judicial tools available to respond to an unstable and
complex political and social reality. In both cases the Court also strove to
generate a historic change in the existing governmental-institutional map
by changing the balance of power among the branches of government.
Furthermore, in both cases the signs of public unrest and the seething
political reality that gave rise to the need for a new direction were not
expressly reflected in the decision. Yet, these raucous, emotional and
often tempestuous political struggles touched on urgent and substantial
issues concerning the identity of the two countries (Israel and the U.S.)
as liberal democracies, but because of the limitations of a court decision
and the legal platform, they can only be recognized between the lines.
Yet, the political circumstances in the U.S. and in Israel that
awoke the need for a precedent-setting constitutional step, and the condi-
tions for the acceptance of such a step, were entirely different. No matter
how revolutionary, the legal analysis and conclusions of Marshall in
Marbury were based on a strong constitutional reality and related to a
formal constitution that had been enacted fourteen years earlier and was
imbued with all the characteristics essential to its strength.
Unlike the sectarianism and the social polarization that existed in
Israel from its very first days, the American Constitution was designed
and drafted by the representatives of a relatively homogeneous society
who shared a similar background and aspirations. These are essential and
indispensable conditions for achieving the consensus from which a
strong constitution can emerge. The difference between the character-
istics of the pre-constitution Israeli and the American society is key to
the distinction between the Israeli and American constitutional
narratives.
The American Constitution is a written document that reflects a
broad and solid social consensus, which is essential for maintaining
social-political stability, even in the face of frequent social change. The
strength of the American Constitution is nurtured by the fact that it was
at hand and without in-depth discussion. In the circumstances of IWN, it would
be better to refrain from ruling that the principle of human dignity, as protected
by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, contains the principle of equality,
since in the circumstances of IWN, a decision could be reached without such an
analysis whose implications transcend beyond the specific case.
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born out of a long and comprehensive process of deliberation, persuasion
56
and compromise. Furthermore, the rules laid down at the Philadelphia
Convention, where the Constitution was debated, were also based on a
consensus. This enabled all the participants at the Convention to support
the final product, even if the road to such support was not an easy one
where there were deep differences on key issues about the American
form of government and the value system upon which it would be estab-
lished. Among these issues were the allocation of power between the
federal government and the states, interstate trade regulation, slavery, the
power to impose and collect taxes, and the protection of human rights.
57
Furthermore, the process of establishing the Constitution was
accompanied by enormous and unprecedented efforts to mobilize the
American public, by means of essays in The Federalist. This enabled the
citizens to absorb and internalize the Constitution, i.e., they believed
themselves to be full partners in the process that imbued the Constitution
with the complete legitimacy so vital for its application and implementa-
tion in society.58 The establishment of the American Constitution was
imposed only after support from the grass roots was guaranteed by
calling upon the American public as a whole. The Founding Fathers of
the American nation were able to form a common and mature consti-
tutional framework within which the normal daily political struggle
could be waged under agreed and accepted rules. Within that framework,
disputes and conflicts of interests could be decided without threatening,
weakening or bringing down the state. Furthermore, the Constitution
gave effective review of the government to all segments of the public,
while allowing it still to function efficiently. Additionally, the Consti-
tution limited the following risk: corruption of power, arbitrariness of
government, and the violation of the rights of individual and minorities.
In these circumstances, the ruling of Justice Marshall in Marbury on the
issue of judicial review although a small step forward, was a step taken
on a firm footing
When the Supreme Court assumed the power of judicial review
in Bank Hamizrahi, it was taking a stance far more complex and
problematic. Whereas the U.S. Supreme Court was called upon to rule in
56 Ruth Gavison, "Lessons from The Federalist and the Constitutional Process
in Israel", 11 Azure, Journal for Israeli Thinking 21, at 27-29 (2001).57 id.
5 Id, at 31.
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Marbury at an early and "virginal" stage in the life of the American
nation, the Israeli Supreme Court was required to consolidate its consti-
tutional powers after almost fifty years during which time its status had
taken shape and its powers had been given content. Also during this time
the Knesset legislation that violated human rights was immune to repeal
by the Court.
The decision in Bank Hamizrahi resolved the issue of judicial
review during a time in which the very issue of a constitution was the
subject of controversy, as opposed to Marbury in which this issue did not
exist. Also, prior to its decision on the controversial question of judicial
review, the American Supreme Court wisely consolidated its status as a
constitutional court. In contrast, the Israeli court, dealt with the matter of
judicial review during of national development that was far more
complex. In current-day Israel, many heavily disputed constitutional
issues still find their way to court, notwithstanding the fact that the first
and more adequate forum would be the political arena.5 '
As in Marbury, the decision of Israel's Supreme Court did not
expressly reflect the political turmoil and the opposing centrifugal forces
at work below the surface, or the fierce dispute surrounding the question
of the constitution that remained unresolved even after the legislation of
the two new Basic Laws. Underlying that legislation, upon which
President Barak built the constitutional revolution, was a non-parlia-
mentary initiative aimed at breathing life into the constitutional project
which had been nipped in the bud, reviving it in a gradual process. This
constitutional process which would involve Basic Laws would start with
the consolidation of individual rights, although the need to protect these
rights against Knesset legislation is not disputed. Officials hoped this
would create momentum that would turn the wheels of the constitutional
project, reawaken discussion of the most intense disputes and eventually
lead to the birth of an Israeli constitution, valid in every respect.
The two new Basic Laws were the result of that initiative. How-
ever, the Israeli public was not partner to this legislation, neither to the
process leading up to Bank Hamizrahi nor to the news of the
"constitutional revolution" that these laws heralded. In fact, the public
was unaware of the "fact" of its existence. It was not by chance that the
legislation of these two Basic Laws was termed a "quiet constitutional
59 See Barak-Erez, supra note 13, at 346.
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revolution". Thus, it comes as no surprise that their enactment did not
reverberate loudly among the public, was not accompanied by the requi-
site lively public and political dialog and was therefore not perceived by
the average Israeli as revolutionary. Only the community of jurists was
excited by the legislation of the Basic Laws, and was the first to discuss
the recent constitutional revolution.
Most important of all, the legislation of the new Basic Laws and
those legislated before them, lacked all the constitutional elements so
necessary for imposing stable constitutional order in a society as
fractured and unstable as the Israeli society. 60 The legislation of the Basic
Laws has never been collated as a single unified, harmonious and
coherent formal constitutional document and they did not come into
being on the basis of predetermined principles and rules Further, the
legislation of the Basic Laws was not accompanied by suitable regulation
of the checks and balances and by reallocation of the power of the
branches of government. Yet, such checks and balances were necessary
as a complementary step for the creation of statutes that would be
superior to ordinary Knesset laws, and in particular, would empower the
Supreme Court to give operative meaning to such superiority through
judicial review.
Furthermore, the legislation of the Basic Laws was not based on
consensus and was not a celebratory and symbolic national act, as is
fitting for the establishment of a constitution. On the contrary, the Basic
Laws were passed in an ordinary process in an atmosphere of an end-of-
season sale. Thirty-two Knesset members voted in favor of Basic Law:
Human Dignity and Liberty, twenty-one voted against it and one
abstained-fifty-four members in total, a tiny figure, taking into account
that this was a constitutional piece of legislation. Basic Law: Freedom of
Occupation was approved unanimously by twenty-three Knesset
members.
The reason that Israel had no formal constitution is not that there
was no need or that no attempt had ever been made to establish one. On
the contrary, Israel desperately needed a formal constitution because of
the problems it had faced since its inception. Unfortunately, the inability
60 For a comprehensive review of the establishment of a constitutional revolution
in Israel by the Supreme Court, see Ruth Gavison, "A Constitutional Revolu-
tion?" in "TOWARDS ANEW EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE" 517 (A. Gambaro, A.M.
Rabello. eds.. 1999. Sacher Institute. Jerusalem).
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of Israel's parliaments to formulate a constitution and the stubborn
opposition of the Knesset to vest the Supreme Court with the power of
judicial review, are proof that when President Barak announced the
constitutional revolution in Bank Hamizrahi, the conditions were not yet
ripe. When Bank Hamizrahi was delivered, Israeli society was too deeply
fissured, too polarized, too divided over the most central questions of its
existence, and therefore unprepared to contain the constitutional revolu-
tion that Justice Barak had created. And certainly the revolution could
not be imposed by an action of the Supreme Court. It is therefore obvious
why at first many legal scholars challenged the statement that Israel now
had a constitution. Yet, this concept was internalized in time, and there is
now almost no controversy over the fact that Israel has a constitution,
although incomplete and feeble.
This tangled and emotional constitutional reality has, of
necessity, implications for the status and power of the Supreme Court,
and it limits the Court in exercising judicial review. Granted, in Marbury,
Justice Marshall declared the Court's power of judicial review even
though the Constitution did not contain any specific provision granting
the Court such power. Still, Marshall's historic ruling was made as part
of an interpretation of the American Constitution, a formal constitutional
document that reflected a strong and stable constitutional reality, valid as
a supreme norm whose content was never disputed and which served as a
unifying element for a homogeneous American society. In this sense,
Marshall's revolution did not arise sui generis, but represented another
layer added to a solid constitutional foundation. Justice Barak, on the
other hand, created two revolutions-the first is a constitutional revolu-
tion, which dealt with the superiority of the basic laws, and the second,
which is built upon the first, the judicial review revolution. Both are
founded on shaky ground compared to that on which the U.S. Supreme
Court was built.
61
It is interesting to note that both in Marbury and in Bank
Hamizrahi, the court refrained from countermanding the legislature,
against which the petition was addressed. In Marbury, in view of his
analysis of the political reality, Marshall held that the Court was not
competent to grant Marbury the relief applied for and to impose upon the
Executive a mandamus as requested. Marshall understood that such
61 See Gavison. ibid. at 524.
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action would be pointless and would only erode even further the status of
the Supreme Court. Marshall's declaration that the Court had the power
of judicial review, his exercise of this power in relation to the
Jurisdiction Act of 1789 and his subsequent repeal of this Act were
intended to prepare the ground for his final conclusion. Additionally, the
Jurisdiction Act, which was invalidated by the Court, broadened the
power of the Supreme Court. Thus, when reviewing and eventually
abrogating the Act, the Court intervened in the affairs of the legislature
relating to the Court itself, effectively curtailing its own powers. In this
sense, the first step of the Court in the path of judicial review was careful
and calculated.
In Bank Hamizrahi, although the Court assumed and exercised
the power of judicial review, the final conclusion was that, contrary to
the position held by the petitioners, the law meets the requirements
authorizing violation as laid down in Basic Law: Human Dignity and
Liberty, and is therefore constitutional and should not be repealed.
Accordingly, along with its declaration of the constitutional revolution
and the power of judicial review vested in it, the Court refrained from
taking any operative action against the legislature. The final conclusion
of the Court in that specific case, i.e., refusing to abolish the statute,
spared the Court from calling upon its own rulings for a practical step
that would erode the power of the legislature. This was a tool in the
hands of the Court to soften the revolutionary and dramatic implications
of the decision. Because the Court was not required to exercise the power
it had assumed, it did not test its willingness to use the "fruits" of the
revolution immediately upon the announcement of these powers; in this
way, the Court prepared the ground for the slow absorption and gradual
internalization of its sensational and precedent-setting decision over a
period of time.
Needless to say, a judicial review "revolution" without specific
authorization in a constitution, is contingent on the status of the Supreme
Court and its powers being fortified in a constitution founded on the
characteristics mentioned above; the first of which is universal accep-
tance of normative superiority. That was the situation in America.
Conversely, Basic Law: The Judiciary, that provides the normative basis
for the operation of the Supreme Court and which was legislated in 1984,
prior to the new Basic Laws and the constitutional revolution, does not
even contain procedural protection. Thus, while the Supreme Court
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assumes the baton of judicial review in Bank Hamizrahi, the status of the
norm that gave it birth is itself disputed as part of the controversy
concerning the status of the basic laws legislated before 1992.62
There is a structural-institutional difference between the Ameri-
can system of government and the Israeli system, within which lies the
distinction between Marbury and Bank Hamizrahi. The system of
government in the American democracy is presidential. The focus of
power and authority is the president, who is elected by the citizens in
direct elections, and accordingly, draws his power from them. Concur-
rently, administrative power is shared with two other branches of
government the two houses of Congress and the Supreme Court, so that
the allocation of power places the three institutions on the same level
where they monitor and review each other in accordance with a proce-
dure defined in a formal constitution whose normative status is superior
to ordinary law, and which stands above all of these institutions.
Israeli democracy, by contrast, is built upon the parliamentary
system. The constitutional structure, which was formed upon the estab-
lishment of the State of Israel, perpetuated and gave legal imprimatur to
the institutions of government as they had developed within the Jewish
community under the British Mandate. This structure places the Israeli
House of Representatives, the Knesset, at the head of the pyramid of
three authorities, and tilts the center of gravity of power and authority
toward the Knesset.63 The basis of the entire Israeli system is therefore
the principle of the autonomy of the Knesset. The Executive is grounded
in, grows from and relies upon the parliamentary coalition for its support.
Therefore, because of the absence of a formal constitution, at least prior
to Bank Hamizrahi, the norm creating the Supreme Court and defining its
powers could be amended by the Knesset by a simple majority. Thus, the
Israeli system lacks the balanced allocation of power between the
Legislature and the Judiciary that is present in the American system,
even though the Israeli judicial system enjoys a large degree of
autonomy and independence. The power of the president of the United
States to veto an act of Congress is one of the expressions of the power
62 Id. at 520. Until the Court ruled in Bank Hamizrahi that a basic law can be
amended only by means of another Basic Law, Basic Law: The Judiciary could
have been amended by an ordinary law passed by a simple majority of members
of the Knesset.63 Id. at 520-521.
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of the Executive in the U.S., a counterweight to the strength of Congress,
and additional testimony to the structural difference between the
American system and the Israeli one, in which the Knesset is superior to
the other two branches. Moreover, in the U.S., the intervention of the
Judiciary in the activities of the Legislature is not so far-reaching a step,
as in any case the Executive has the power to do the same, but in a
different way.64
Furthermore, the difference in the procedure for the nomination
and appointment of Supreme Court Justices in the U.S. and Israel is
analogous to the distinction between the two countries. American
Supreme Court Justices are appointed for life, directly by the President,
yet another expression of the power of the American Executive Branch
compared with the Israeli. Obviously, the political nature of these
appointments detracts from the principle of autonomy and independence
of the judicial branch, which is so vital to democracy. Yet, the counter to
this is that the appointment of justices by the president awards the
American Supreme Court a representative dimension that facilitates the
drafting of revolutionary rulings and extends the legitimate basis for such
decisions.
Conversely, the system by which Justices are appointed to the
Supreme Court in Israel is one of the most apolitical in the world.65
Supreme Court Justices are appointed by the Nominations Committee,
whose nine members are mainly representatives of the three branches of
government, including two Justices of the Supreme Court and the
President of the Court. The Israeli Supreme Court is therefore a non-
representative body and even defines itself as one that must reflect the
mood, worldviews, values and norms of Israeli society, but not represent
it. The system by which judges are appointed, which embodies the
principle of checks and balances and keeps the Court autonomous,
objective, independent and unbiased, is a fitting one even though the
Court is neither elected nor representative; it is the source of the Israeli
public's great confidence in the Supreme Court and the reason that the
Supreme Court is perceived as the least unbiased institution.
64 Although the final legislative power remains with Congress, which can
overrule a veto by a special majority, the special majority requirement reflects
the structural difference between the Israeli and the American system as to the
status of the legislature compared with that of the other branches of government.
65 See Gavison, supra note 60, at 522-523.
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In view of the distinctions described above, it is safe to say that
in some aspects, Marshall's judicial review revolution in Marbury was
far more groundbreaking, but far less dramatic, than that of the Israeli
Supreme Court in Bank Hamizrahi. Accordingly, it seems that the rulings
of the American court cannot be automatically applied for the purpose of
judicial review in Israel.
B. Kach Case and the Separation ofPowers
The separation of powers is the cornerstone of democracy and a
precondition for human liberty. The question of the separation of powers
was reflected in its fullest in Marbury in two ways. First, the boundaries
of the Court's intervention in an action of the executive arm of govern-
ment; second, the demarcation of the boundaries for intervention by the
Judiciary into the work of Congress. The next few paragraphs will be
dedicated to the second aspect, as addressed by Israel's Supreme Court
and the U.S. Supreme Court.
In Israel, as in other modern democracies, the system of govern-
ment is based on the modern understanding of the separation of powers:
it is not the traditional, classical concept as expressed by Montesquieu,
i.e., three branches legislative, executive and judiciary with a firewall
between them, such that each has exclusive jurisdiction in its realm
without any review by the other branches. 66 The modern understanding
of the separation of powers is founded on the concept of checks and
balances, which means that the three branches are independent, but
continually review one another based on predefined mechanisms.
67
According to this system, while each of the three branches
implements its primary power independently of the others, defined
checks and balances exist among them. In this way, the responsibility for
the decisions of the sovereign is distributed among the three because
none of the branches has absolute and unlimited responsibility for the
decisions that will be implemented by any of the others.
Balancing the powers of the three branches is a delicate task. In
the Israeli system, the main tension is between the Legislative, which in
66 See generally, CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT
OF THE LAWS (1748).
67 HCJ 306/81 Shmuel Plato Sharon v. Knesset Committee, [1981] IsrSC 35(4),
118, 141; HCJ 910/86 Ressler et al. v. Minister of Defense [1988] IsrSC 3242(2)
441,491.
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Israel's parliamentary system reflects the will of the people, and the
Supreme Court. The tension tends to arise when the Court is required to
review the way in which the Legislative exercises its powers.
The interpretation the U.S. Supreme Court gave the Act of
Congress, which led to the declaration of the Act as void, was in and of
itself an intervention in the Executive Branch. As noted, Marshall
interpreted Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which authorized the
Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus to civil servants, as granting
the Court more power than given to it by the Constitution. Marshall held
that the court system is exclusively responsible for the interpretation of
the law: "It is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial
department, to say what is the law."
The Israeli court followed suit even though Marshall's interpre-
tation was not the only one possible. In fact, it was farfetched. A careful
reading of Section 13 shows that the last sentence, on which the Court
based its opinion that this Section was an attempt to extend the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in violation of the Constitution, relates
to petitions only, so that the interpretation of the Section as dovetailing
with Constitution was in fact the appropriate analysis. Yet, Marshall
chose an interpretation whereby Section 13 conflicted with the
Constitution because this enabled him to hold the Act void. Marshall's
move, which is built on an unlikely interpretation of Section 13, was a
maneuver between the obstacles that the Court was facing in Marbury
and the implications that Marshall feared, but it was also a reflection of
his resolve to remind the three branches of government that they are
interdependent. The question of the Court's competence and power to
interpret the product of the Legislative Branch and the question of the
Court's interpretation vis-A-vis the interpretation provided by the
legislature, were also at the heart of the debate in the Israeli decision in
the Kach case.68 In Kach, a Member of the Knesset, Meir Kahane, who
was the only parliamentary representative of his party, petitioned the
Supreme Court, in its capacity as the High Court of Justice, to declare
void the decision of the Knesset Speaker prohibiting him from initiating
a vote of non-confidence. The Knesset Speaker explained that he had
stopped Kahane from submitting his bill because Kach was a one-man
party, and according to the Knesset Bylaws and based on previous
68 HCJ 73/85 Kach Party v. Knesset Speaker Shlomo Hillel,[1985] JsrSC 39(3)
141 (hereinafter: "Kach").
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resolutions of the House Committee that interpreted the Bylaws, and on a
longstanding parliamentary tradition, a one-man party cannot submit a
bill of no-confidence.
In order to decide the case, the Court was required to interpret
the relevant section of the Knesset Bylaws, which addresses votes of no-
confidence. First, the Court opined that the decision of the House
Committee must be based on this section, and if the section conflicts
with parliamentary tradition, the Bylaws prevail. Second, given the
language, purpose and constitutional rationale of the section, a one-man
party must not be prohibited from submitting a bill of no-confidence. The
third point, which is the most important, is that the interpretation
provided by the Court overrides that of the House Committee; the Court
has the final authority to interpret any piece of legislation and the
principles of separation of powers and checks and balances, which are a
precondition for democracy, require this interpretation to be binding
upon the parties. To support this holding, the Israeli court cited Marshall
in Marbury.
In the context of the separation of powers, in order to understand
the boundaries for the implementation of Marbury in the Israeli arena, a
distinction should be drawn between the circumstances of Marbury and
those of Kach. In Marbury, the Court was reviewing a section of a
principal piece of legislation, an act of Congress Article 3 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. In Kach, the court was reviewing a section of the
Bylaws of the Israeli parliament, the Knesset. These Bylaws are adopted
by the Knesset, under the authority vested in it in Article 19 of Basic
Law: The Knesset. The bylaws regulate internal parliamentary proce-
dures, such as those of the Plenary, the Knesset committees and the
Legislature. The interpretation of a section of the Bylaws of the Knesset,
especially one that conflicts with a longstanding parliamentary custom,
constitutes interference by the Supreme Court in a purely inter-
parliamentary affair. This can therefore be viewed as meddling in the
activities of the Knesset and as an intervention that violates the balance
between the Judiciary and the Legislative in a far more radical way than
Marshall did in Marbury.
Indeed, the Speaker of the Knesset, who represented the
respondent in Kach, noted that the Court should exercise particular
caution before reviewing the parliament's internal mechanisms. While
this comment related generally to the intervention of the Court in the
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decision of the Knesset Speaker, rather than to its interpretation of the
specific section of the Bylaws, the underlying logic is the same. In its
pleadings, counsel for the Knesset Speaker said that this dispute was not
adjudicable, i.e., the Court must refrain from deciding the dispute
between the petitioner and the respondent. According to this approach,
with regard to inter-parliamentary affairs, the Court must act with
restraint and avoid any unnecessary friction between the Legislative and
the Judiciary.69 As mentioned, the Court rejected this view.
Granted, interpretation by the court of the laws enacted by the
Legislature also constitutes intervention; but this kind of intervention is
an integral role of the court and lies within its jurisdiction. This is
because of the principle of checks and balances and is in congruity with
the desired manner of balancing, decentralizing and allocating the power
between the Legislative Branch and the Judiciary. The internal
procedures of parliament as an institution have practically no such
influence-even though these internal procedures can eventually impact
69 The advocates of this approach maintain that even if the standard view in
England, whereby parliamentary procedures are carved out of the realm of
judicial review (R.F.V. HEUSTON, ESsAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Stevens &
Sons ed. 2nd ed. 1964); Bradlaugh v. Gossett (1884)), is not to be followed, the
Court's intervention in inter-parliamentary affairs must be restricted according
to the "parameters of functional authority". This parameter allows the Court to
review inter-parliamentary affairs only where they exceed the functional author-
ity of the entity perform the act under review. In Kach, counsel for the Respon-
dent argued that this was also the yardstick defined in the U.S. in Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 589 (1969). As noted, despite the arguments made
on behalf of the Knesset Speaker, the Court opted for the majority opinion as
expressed in the case law before, and implemented the less restrained parameter
whereby the Court's intervention in inter-parliamentary affairs is not limited to
cases of act performed ultra vires. Even if not performed ultra vires, the relevant
question the Court opined is the extent of the alleged violation of the "fabric
of parliamentary life" and the impact of this violation on the foundations of the
constitutional structure-two questions which are up to the Court to decide. The
Court insisted on this approach despite the argument made on behalf of the
Respondent, that this yardstick does not offer certainty; it is vague, loose and
obscure, and therefore invites excessive interference by the Court. "Parameters
of functional authority" and the "fabric of parliamentary life" are legal tests
initiated by Chief Justice Barak. According to these legal concepts the Supreme
Court will interfere with internal legislative processes of the Knesset only when
parliamentary acts threatened the fabric of democratic life.
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the way society conducts itself because the institutional structure and
procedures might have an impact on the substance of the acts of
parliament.
Furthermore, the fact that Israel employs the parliamentary
system also impacts the question of the court's intervention in inter-
parliamentary procedures. As noted, the Israeli system, which is based on
the principle of the sovereignty of the Knesset, puts the parliament above
the two other branches of government. That, combined with the fact that
the Supreme Court is not a representative institution because of the
mechanism by which justices are appointed, leads to the conclusion that
the structure of the Israeli system calls for special care with regard to the
interference of the Court in the internal activity of the representatives of
the people. In any event, it seems that there is room to question the
unqualified way in which the Court implemented Marbury in Kach,
without drawing the necessary distinction that while Marshall was
analyzing an act of Congress, Kach related to the bylaws of the Knesset.
V. EPILOGUE
In this paper we tried to compare two cases in which Israel's
Supreme Court cited Marbury, and Marbury itself.
The courts in both Bank Hamizrahi and Marbury empowered
themselves to conduct judicial review, and thus forever changed the
balance of powers among the three arms of government. In Marbury, the
purpose of the American court was to reinforce its own status in balance
with the other two arms of government. In Bank Hamizrahi, the goal of
the Israeli court was, in the face of a moral decline in the political and
public sector, to put Israel among the enlightened, civilized nations
whose systems are founded upon formal constitutions.
We have shown that, in the absence of a solid constitutional
foundation, such as the one existing in the U.S. when Marshall delivered
Marbury, the ability of the Israeli court to implement Marbury was a bit
limited. We have further explained the structural and institutional
differences between the American and Israeli systems and the
implications of these differences on the relationship between the Israeli
Supreme Court and the Knesset. We have shown that the structural
difference between Israel's parliamentary system, which is based on the
principle of the wide sovereignty of the Knesset, and the American
presidential system, in which the status of the Congress is inherently
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more balanced, gives rise to the distinction that the Israeli Court has less
liberty to interfere with the operations of the Knesset than does the U.S.
Supreme Court in the acts of Congress and certainly this is the case
when the operation at hand is an inter-parliamentary affair, as in Kach.
The comparative analysis provided above indicates that the
dispute surrounding the intervention of Israel's Supreme Court in the
operations of the Knesset does not revolve around the principle of inter-
vention, but rather around the degree of intervention that should be
allowed. Although most jurists in Israel agree that the Court has the
power to review the acts of the Knesset, they are divided on the extent of
this power. The question of degree is also the focus of the distinction
between Marbury and the way it was implemented in the Israeli cases
described herein.

